This post originally appeared on Hockey Graphs.
The NHL is in the middle of a goalie pulling frenzy. While the year is still young, coaches of teams who are losing by a goal have been pulling their goalie roughly around the 1:40 mark of the 3rd period the last two years, about 40 seconds earlier than they were in previous years. This development, of course, is a long time coming – analysts have been arguing for years that teams should be more aggressive in removing their netminders.
Yesterday, Tyler Dellow had an interesting post over at The Athletic (paywall) examining why not all ice-time against opponents is created equally. By drilling down on how the Leafs’ defensive units fared against various levels of competition last year, Tyler was able to dig into why Toronto’s bottom pair was able to do better against top 6 competition than their top pairing did.
The whole thing is a worthwhile read, but the one line that stood out to me was this:
The point is that [Roman Polak and Andreas Borgman] got time against the opposition’s top line in circumstances in which that line didn’t really pose an attacking threat.
The overall idea that Tyler presented is pretty intuitive but also incredibly important: if you come on the ice when your opponent is finishing their shift, they’re unlikely to be mounting much of an offensive push, and most of their effort will likely be focused on advancing the puck out of their zone and getting of the ice.
This post originally appeared on Hockey Graphs.
It’s the Olympics again, which means it’s time for everyone’s favorite activity: watching Canada underperform at ice-hockey! And while Hilary Knight breaking the hearts of Canadians is fun for everybody, the only thing that’s more fun is watching Hilary Knight break the hearts of Canadians while you have a statistical model that predicts each team’s likelihood of winning a medal! That’s right, Hockey Graphs is taking on the challenge of predicting the Women’s Olympic Hockey Tournament results.[1]
Last February I was fortunate enough to attend the Sloan Sports Analytics Conference (mostly due to the excellent work of the ever-amazing Ryan Stimson). One of the marquee events was a panel titled “Moneymind: Overcoming Cognitive Bias“, which featured 4 of the best known “Money[sport]” GMs (Daryl Morey, Sam Hinkie, Farhan Zaidi, and Billy Beane) talking about how they make decisions and what makes their respective management styles different from most executives in their sports.
While the whole panel was endlessly informative and extremely entertaining, one thing Daryl Morey said about the Rockets approach to implementing strategies really stuck with me:
“One thing I think all of us have done is more take the lessons that are sort of obvious that everyone has agreed to and taken them to the logical conclusion. Which is, for example us, it’s better to make 3 than 2 on a shot…genius, right…taking it to it’s logical conclusion, which is shoot 50 of them a night.”
Basically what Morey was saying is that if all the work you’ve done has shown that a strategy is beneficial, don’t hedge your bets and only go half-in on it. It’s this idea that’s been floating around in my head for the last 2 days since I wrote about optimizing contract structure – if GMs could theoretically save cap space by setting up contracts to pay more money to players upfront, how much total cap room could they create simply by structuring their contracts in the most efficient way possible?
One of the weird but infrequently mentioned quirks of salary negotiations in the NHL is the competing interests of players and owners with regards to how the actual salary payments should be structured. While analysts tend to focus on the AAV when evaluating a deal, the details of how much a player gets in each year are actually critical to understanding how much a team values a player.
Last night, Jake Gardiner made a bad decision. Faced with a 2-on-1 in a tie game midway through the 2nd period, Gardiner made what seemed like the smart choice – he played the pass, leaving Curtis McElhinney to deal with what appeared to be an easy foe in 34-year old Trevor Daley[1]. Daley, however, defied the odds[2] and placed a perfect shot in the top left corner to give the Red Wings a 2-1 lead.
While defensemen are often taught to take the pass and leave the shooter to the goalie, Gardiner’s execution left a lot to be desired. As Justin Bourne noted, when you give the shooter that much space you’re basically turning a 2-on-1 into a 1-on-0.
Beyond the poor execution though, there’s a more general question about the wisdom of playing the pass and not the shot. Taking the pass and trusting your goalie to stop the shot is an idea that’s drilled into defencemen’s minds from a young age, and on its face it makes a lot of sense – we know that shots of passes go in more often than those off shots, so if you’re looking to minimize goals against (a pretty good idea for a defencemen) your best bet is to take away the higher percentage play.
The other day I tweeted out a bunch of stuff about why teams may want to avoid a 4-forward power play when they’re up late. I’m not going to bother turning this into a full post, but I’ve linked the tweets here so they’re actually saved in a (somewhat) organized fashion).
| Nick Foligno gives s… on Shot Location Data and Strateg… | |
 | Can Babcock, Maple L… on Shot Location Data and Strateg… |
| Weekly Sports Analyt… on Should teams pull their goalie… | |
| Sharks' Joe Tho… on Why teams should use 4 forward… | |
| Sharks' Joe Tho… on Why teams should use 4 forward… |
